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What’s the difference?  
Transformation is when something 
is turned into something 
else, as in the conversion of 
carbohydrates to sugar during 
digestion. 
Encoding is transformation into 
a code that carries information 
and can be decoded, as in the 
transformation of a text message 
into Morse code. 
The term ‘representation’ is 
used in many senses, but is 
generally understood as a process 
in which something is used to 
stand in for something else, as in 
the use of the symbol ‘I’ to stand 
for the author of this article.
So what is the (biological) 
problem? These terms are often 
conflated in neurobiology, with 
the firing pattern of a neuron (or 
across a population of neurons) 
interchangeably referred to as a 
‘representation’, ‘encoding’ or 
‘transformation’ of an external 
stimulus. 
Are these terms not 
interchangeable? To say a 
neuronal firing pattern is a 
transformation of a stimulus 
places the focus on the causal 
relationship, like any other 
physiological process: how the 
internal state of the nervous 
system is changed by the 
external state of the world, and 
how this internal state mediates 
the production of behaviour. 
‘Encoding’ suggests the 
internal state is an information-
preserving mapping, involving 
systematic correspondence, 
such as maintaining the spatial 
layout of the receptor array, 
or the firing rate varying with 
signal amplitude. It also implies 
that what stimulus property is 
mapped to what neural property 
is in some sense arbitrary, as long as it is consistent, that is, 
can be decoded. The role of a 
code in a system depends on the 
information it carries, rather than 
its physical structure per se; the 
classic biological example is the 
genetic code.
Representation, in the sense of 
standing-in, suggests the neural 
activity can be used instead of the 
stimulus, indeed, even when the 
stimulus itself is absent. This point 
was central to the introduction 
of the notion of representation in 
cognitive psychology [1] —  
that not all behaviour could 
be explained by reference to 
current stimuli and the history 
of reinforcement. Direct sensing 
is presentation of the stimulus, 
but some cognitive capabilities 
depend on the ability to re-present 
(possibly in a highly abstracted 
form) the stimulus when it is not 
directly sensed. 
Does it make any difference 
what terminology we use? 
Calling neural activity the 
‘transformation’ of a stimulus is 
merely to say they are causally 
related, in some way that can be 
discovered. To say it ‘encodes’ a 
stimulus is a stronger empirical 
claim: that there is a systematic 
mapping between the stimulus 
and the neural activity; raising 
the question of what information 
is preserved and implying we 
can discover how it is decoded 
by the nervous system. To say it 
‘represents’ a stimulus suggests 
that the processes leading to that 
neural activity have as their aim 
the construction of something that 
can stand in for the stimulus.
Can you give an example? A 
toad-like system for catching 
prey could be built using a set 
of vector weights to simply 
transform the output of an 
array of motion sensors to the 
appropriate activation of a set 
of tongue muscles. Real toads 
are more adaptive [2], combining 
the output of motion sensors 
with other information about 
object dimensions, motivational 
state, and so on, to encode the 
presence of prey items, not just 
moving objects. A super-toad 
could hypothetically construct 
an internal geometric model of the prey’s trajectory and its own 
position in three dimensional 
space, such that it could plan to 
make any arbitrary movement and 
produce a tongue snap to where 
it expects that particular fly to be 
relative to itself (and notice, if it 
fails, that something about the 
representation was incorrect).
So the different terms suggest 
different mechanisms? Yes, 
so their use is not neutral, 
but influences experimental 
paradigms and the interpretation 
of data. There is a great deal 
of work on trying to ‘crack’ the 
‘neural code’ [3], which assumes 
there is an information-preserving 
mapping between stimulus and 
neural activity. 
There is also a significant 
amount of work on trying to 
find where and how the brain 
reconstructs its perception of the 
world, for example addressing 
the ‘binding problem’ [4] or 
looking for the neural correlates 
of consciousness [5]. These 
approaches clearly go beyond 
the basic assumption that we can 
find consistent causal relations 
between stimuli, brain states and 
behaviour — they assume there 
is more than mere transformation 
taking place.
But aren’t nervous systems 
always doing encoding? It 
is always possible to treat 
neural activity as a code for the 
stimulus, to try to determine what 
information has been preserved. 
Whether this is always the most 
productive way to understand the 
function is a different question. 
We cannot assume that the 
information is actually decoded 
in some subsequent stage of 
processing. Indeed it is not 
entirely clear what ‘decoding’ 
means in this context. The 
nervous system is not trying 
literally to reconstruct the 
stimulus, in the way that DNA is 
used to reconstruct proteins, or a 
telegraph operator reconstructs a 
verbal message from Morse code. 
What the nervous system needs 
to do, in general, is to transform 
the input into the right action. 
Except in the special case of 
imitation, the mapping from input 
to output is not one of identity. 
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stimulus takes us in the opposite 
direction from processing to 
perform the right action. 
But generally information is 
preserved? As the task is to 
produce the right action, it should 
not be surprising that the ‘neural 
code’ is often not especially 
good at preserving information 
[6]. There is never a strictly 
isomorphic relationship between 
stimulus and neural response: 
it is typically non-linear, often 
non-monotonic, and may change 
with the contexts of the history 
of stimulation (adaptation and 
learning), of other signals and of 
behaviour. 
It will sometimes make 
more sense to treat this 
as simple transformation, 
particularly in cases of basic 
sensorimotor control, when 
significant transformation may 
be implemented in the sensory 
physics, as ‘matched filtering’ [7]. 
What then becomes interesting 
is to discover, empirically, those 
systems in which the information 
does seem to be preserved; even 
more, when what is encoded is 
some information in the world 
that does not correspond to a 
single sensory input but seems 
to require the combination of 
several inputs to construct. 
An example is the recently 
discovered ‘grid’ cell system in 
rat hippocampus [8].
What about representation? To 
say the neural activity caused by a 
stimulus ‘stands in’ for it, despite 
being a common way of speaking, 
collapses the critical distinction 
between simple causal mediation, 
and the ability to use one thing 
instead of another. For example, 
in discussing the relation of distal 
to proximal stimuli, it does not 
seem sensible to say that we are 
using the light waves instead of 
the object; at the very least, this 
case clearly differs from when we 
use one visible object, such as 
a landmark, instead of another, 
such as a currently invisible goal 
location, to do a task. 
To say that neural activity is 
used ‘instead of’ whatever caused 
it seems to involve a similar 
confusion of points of view.  A neuroscientist, as an external 
observer of both an animal’s 
neural activity and its stimuli, 
might use one to stand in for 
the other. The animal, however, 
cannot; it has access to stimuli 
but no access to brain states. 
Considered as subsystems, some 
parts of the brain have access to 
neural activity of other parts of the 
brain, but they do not have access 
to the stimuli.
So are you claiming 
nervous systems do not use 
representation? Not at all. 
The argument is for treating 
representation as a (special) 
function of (some) nervous 
systems; specifically, the ability 
to recreate internally something 
that has the same effect, or can 
be used in the same way, as an 
external situation, especially when 
that external situation does not 
currently pertain. 
A good example is the notion 
of an emulator [9]: that nervous 
systems may require predictive 
models of the consequences 
of their own actions to perform 
successful control. A simpler 
example might be memories 
from which we can extract new 
information about past states 
of affairs to influence current 
action. Note not all learning — in 
particular not simple associative 
learning — allows this flexibility. 
A final example might be 
the demonstration — yet to be 
provided? [10] — that rats actually 
use the neural encoding of space 
in their place-cell system to 
calculate novel routes to a goal. 
One way to characterise this idea 
of representation is that it requires 
the organism to be able to detect 
when misrepresentation has 
occurred, for example to discover 
(by direct sensing) that the 
represented state of affairs does 
not pertain, or that the expected 
result from the actions based on 
the representation fails to occur.
Many people use 
‘representation’ more 
loosely, for example, to mean 
transformation or encoding; is 
this really a problem? Current 
usage results in a tendency 
to slide between the different 
meanings. Researchers start out discussing ‘neural representation’ 
as the relationship of input signals, 
neural activity and behavioural 
output (transformation), then 
define it as “the information the 
[neural] signal provides when 
decoded”, and then draw an 
explicit link between this coding 
and the intentional content of 
mental states [11]. 
Understanding the neural 
mechanisms linking stimuli to 
behaviour is vital but in many 
cases will tell us nothing about 
mental content. Similarly, 
understanding mental content 
is a fascinating question, but is 
not answered by using the label 
‘representation’ for all neural 
transformation. Finally, identifying 
cases where the nervous system 
needs to, and does, reconstruct 
a stand-in for the stimulus is 
a critical empirical issue and 
should not be trivialised by 
the assumption that this is the 
function of all neural processing.
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